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1 Introduction
This paper considers conditions for social preferences over infinite utility streams and
explores a middle ground between discounted utilitarianism and maximin. Maximin
makes no use of interpersonal unit comparability (even if utilities are unit compa-
rable), while discounted utilitarianism makes no use of interpersonal level compara-
bility (even if utilities are level comparable). One can, however, argue that intuitive
notions of justice, also in the case of social preferences over infinite intergenerational
utility streams, make non-trivial use of both unit comparability and level compara-
bility.
The framework in the main parts of this paper (Sections 2–5) follows the ap-
proach of Koopmans (1960)1 by assuming completeness, transitivity, and continuity
(in the sup topology), entailing numerical representability. However, we open up for
a class of social preferences that is considerably wider than the class of discounted
utilitarian social preferences. In particular, we adapt variations of Koopmans’ Pos-
tulates 1–5, while not considering his additional Postulate 3′. It is only by means of
the latter postulate—which in the words of Heal (2001) is “restrictive” and “surely
not innocent”—that Koopmans moves beyond a recursive form (also obtained in
Proposition 1 below) to arrive at discounted utilitarianism.
We show that by introducing a one-sided equity condition (“Hammond Equity for
the future”), stating that a sacrifice of the present generation leading to an equal gain
for all future generations is weakly desirable if the present remains better off than the
future, it is possible to make use of interpersonal level comparability of (at least)
ordinally measurable utility within the recursive form, leading to a sustainability
constraint. On the other hand, by making use of interpersonal unit comparability
of (at least) cardinally measurable utility through a utilitarian condition (“Present-
future linearity”) and imposing that “Hammond Equity for the future” does not
1See also Koopmans (1986a,b).
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hold, we obtain a new characterization of discounted utilitarianism. We use these
results to shed light on Chichilnisky’s (1996) ‘sustainable’ social preferences.
In the context of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of capital accumulation and
resource depletion, it has been argued that both discounted utilitarianism and max-
imin lead to problematic outcomes: Discounted utilitarianism undermines the liveli-
hood of generations in the distant future (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974, 1979), while
maximin may perpetuate poverty (Solow, 1974). We indicate how a middle ground
between discounted utilitarianism and maximin—by accepting trade-off between the
present and the future if and only if the present is worse off than the future—yields
interesting, and possibly appealing outcomes, in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model.
Koopmans (1960) has often been interpreted as presenting the definite case for
discounted utilitarianism. Sections 2–5 of this paper seek to weaken this impression,
by exploring other avenues within the general setting of his approach.
In the final Section 6 we leave Koopman’s framework and explore the conse-
quences of relaxing continuity. It is well-known (see, e.g., Diamond, 1965; Basu and
Mitra, 2003a; Suzumura and Shinotsuka, 2003; Bossert et al., 2004) that continuity
(and even an assumption of numerical representability) is not without normative
significance when combined with sensitivity conditions. In line with these contri-
butions, we note that our condition “Hammond Equity for the future” cannot be
combined with both continuity and Strong Pareto. Building on Asheim and Tun-
godden (2004), Basu and Mitra (2003b), and Bossert et al. (2004), we show that, if
we drop continuity, there exist social preferences that satisfy our remaining condi-
tions, including Strong Pareto and “Hammond Equity for the future”. However, if
we drop “Hammond Equity for the future” while keeping continuity, Strong Pareto,
and the other conditions we consider, we obtain an alternative characterization of
discounted utilitarianism.
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2 Basic characterization result
Consider a discrete time setting, with an infinite but countable number of genera-
tions, where the instantaneous well-being of generation t is represented by utility
ut that can take on values in the unit interval [0, 1].2 Assume that, at each time t,
there are social preferences ºt over the utility streams tu = (ut, ut+1, . . . ) in [0, 1]∞
starting at time t, where ∞ = |N| and N denotes the set of natural numbers.
Throughout this paper we assume at least ordinally measurable level comparable
utilities; i.e. what Blackorby et al. (1984) refer to as “level-plus comparability”.
Write conw := (w,w, . . . ) for a stream with a constant level of utility equal to
w ∈ [0, 1].
Consider the following conditions on ºt.
Condition O (Order) For each t ≥ 1, ºt is complete and transitive.
Condition C (Continuity) For each t ≥ 1, if limn→∞ sups≥t |uns − u′s| = 0 and, for
all n, tun ºt tu′′ (resp. tu′′ ºt tun), then tu′ ºt tu′′ (resp. tu′′ ºt tu′).
Condition TI (Time invariance) For each t ≥ 1, tu′ ºt tu′′ if and only if 1v′ º1
1v′′, where, for each s ≥ 1, v′s = u′t+s−1 and v′′s = u′′t+s−1.
Condition S (Sensitivity) For each t ≥ 1, if for all s ≥ t, u′s > u′′s , and there exists
T ≥ t such that for all s ≥ T , u′s = w′ and u′′s = w′′, then tu′ Ât tu′′.
Condition IF (Independent future) For each t ≥ 1, (ut, t+1u′) ºt (ut, t+1u′′) if
and only if t+1u′ ºt+1 t+1u′′.
2A more general formulation is, as used by Koopmans (1960), to assume that the well-being
of generation t depends on a n-dimensional vector ct that takes on values in a connected set C.
However, by representing the well-being of generation t by a scalar ut, we can do without his
Postulate 3(a) and focus on intergenerational issues. In doing so, we follow, e.g., Chichilnisky
(1996), Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003) and Bossert et al. (2004).
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Condition EP (Extreme streams) For each t ≥ 1 and for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞,
con0 ¹t tu ¹t con1 .
Conditions O, C and TI correspond to Koopmans’ (1960) Postulate 1, condi-
tion S substitutes a weak form of Weak Pareto (comparing only streams where the
tails have constant well-being) for his Postulate 2, condition IF is equivalent to his
Postulates 3b and 4, while condition EP coincides with his Postulate 5.
If TI is invoked, then ºt is independent of t, and we may write º for the common
preferences (i.e., for each t, tu′ ºt tu′′ if and only if tu′ º tu′′). Provided that
TI is satisfied, say that a social welfare function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] represents the
social preferences, º, if the following two statements are equivalent for each t:
(1) tu′ º tu′′.
(2) W (tu′) ≥W (tu′′).
Proposition 1 Assume that O, C, TI, S, IF, and EP hold. Then the social
preferences, º, are represented by a social welfare function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1]
satisfying
(a) if limn→∞ sups≥t |uns − u′s| = 0 and, for all n, W (tun) ≥ W (tu′′) (resp.
W (tu′′) ≥W (tun)), then W (tu′) ≥W (tu′′) (resp. W (tu′′) ≥W (tu′)), and
(b) for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞, conW (tu) ∼t tu and W (tu) = Υ(ut,W (t+1u)), where
Υ(u,w) is continuous, non-decreasing in u, and increasing in w.
Proof. By TI, we may let the streams start at time 1. Consider any 1u ∈ [0, 1]∞.
By O, C, S, and EP there is a unique w ∈ [0, 1] such that conw ∼ 1u; i.e., conw is
the stationary equivalent of 1u. Let W (1u) = w. It follows that W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1]
represents º and is continuous in the sup topology.
It now follows from IF that, for any u1 ∈ [0, 1], there exists a positive monotone
transformation Υ(u1, ·) such that, for all 2u, W (u1, 2u) = Υ(u1, W (2u)). This
determines Υ, where Υ(u,w) is increasing in w. Since W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] is
continuous in the sup topology, we have that Υ is continuous.
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Suppose u′1 > u′′1 and Υ(u′1,W (2u)) < Υ(u′′1,W (2u)). Write W (2u) = w′′ and
keep in mind that 2u ∼ conw′′. By continuity, there exists w′ > w′′ such that
Υ(u′1,W (2u)) < Υ(u
′
1,W (conw
′)) < Υ(u′′1,W (2u)) = Υ(u
′′
1,W (conw
′′)) ,
contradicting S. Hence Υ(u,w) is non-decreasing in u.
3 Hammond Equity for the future
Consider a stream (u, conw) having the property that well-being is constant from
the second period on. For such a stream we may unequivocally say that, if u < w,
then the present is worse off than the future. Likewise, if u > w, then the present
is better off than the future. This lays a foundation for introducing the following
condition.
Condition HEF (Hammond Equity for the future) For each t ≥ 1, u′′ > u′ > w′ >
w′′ implies (u′, conw′) ºt (u′′, conw′′).
For streams where well-being is constant from the second period on, Condition
HEF states the following: If the present is better off than the future and a sacrifice
now leads to an equal gain for all future generations, then such a transfer from the
present to the future is weakly desirable in social evaluation, as long as the present
remains better off than the future. To appreciate the weakness of condition HEF,
consider first the standard Hammond Equity condition (Hammond, 1976) and a
weak version of Lauwers’ (1998) non-substitution condition.
Condition HE (Hammond Equity) For each t ≥ 1, tu′ ºt tu′′ whenever tu′ and
tu′′ satisfy that there exists a pair q, r such that u′′q > u′q > u′r > u′′r and u′s = u′′s
for all s ≥ t with s 6= q, r.
Condition WNS (Weak non-substitution) For each t ≥ 1, w′ > w′′ implies (u′,
conw
′) ºt (u′′, conw′′).
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By assuming, in addition, that utilities are at least cardinally measurable and
fully comparable, we may also consider weak versions of the Pigou-Dalton and Lorenz
domination principles.
Condition WPD (Weak Pigou-Dalton) For each t ≥ 1, tu′ ºt tu′′ whenever
tu′ and tu′′ satisfy that there exist a positive number ε and a pair q, r such that
u′′q − ε = u′q ≥ u′r = u′′r + ε and u′s = u′′s for all s ≥ t with s 6= q, r.
Condition WLD (Weak Lorenz domination) For each t ≥ 1, tu′ ºt tu′′ whenever
tu′ and tu′′ satisfy that there exists T > t such that tu′T Lorenz dominates tu
′′
T and
T+1u′ = T+1u′′.3
While it is clear that condition HEF is implied by WNS—as HEF in contrast
to WNS does not preclude that a finite improvement for the first generation can
compensate for a uniform loss for all future generations, provided that the present
is worse off than the future—it is perhaps less obvious that, under transitivity and
sensitivity, HEF is weaker than each of HE, WPD, and WLD.
Proposition 2 Assume that O and S hold. Then each of HE, WPD, and WLD
implies HEF.
Proof. Assume u′′ > u′ > w′ > w′′. We must show under O and S that each of
HE, WPD, and WLD implies, for each t, (u′, conw′) ºt (u′′, conw′′).
Since u′′ > u′ > w′ > w′′, there exist an integer n and utilities v, x ∈ [0, 1]
satisfying u′ > v ≥ w′ > x > w′′ and u′′ − v = n(x− w′′).
If HE holds, then (v, x, conw′′) ºt (u′′, conw′′), and by S, (u′, conw′) Ât (v, x,
conw
′′). By transitivity, (u′, conw′) Ât (u′′, conw′′).
3For any utility stream starting at time t tu = (ut, ut+1, . . . ) ∈ [0, 1]∞ and any time T ≥ t, let
tuT = (ut, ut+1, . . . , uT ) ∈ [0, 1]T−t+1 denote the truncation of tu at T . Recall that tu′T Lorenz
dominates tu
′′
T if
PT
s=t u
′
s =
PT
s=t u
′′
s and the Lorenz curve of tu
′
T lies uniformly above tu
′′
T .
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Consider next WPD and WLD. Let tu0 = (u′′, conw′′), and define, ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, tui inductively as follows:
uis = u
i−1
s − (x− w′′) for s = t
uis = x for s = t+ i
uis = u
i−1
s for s 6= t, t+ i .
If WPD holds, then, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, tui ºt t ui−1, and by S, (u′, conw′) Ât
tun. By transitivity, (u′, conw′) Ât (u′′, conw′′) since tu0 = (u′′, conw′′).
If WLD holds, then tun ºt t u0, and by S, (u′, conw′) Ât tun. By transitivity,
(u′, conw′) Ât (u′′, conw′′) since tu0 = (u′′, conw′′).
Note that condition HEF involves a comparison between a sacrifice by a single
generation and an equal gain for each member of an infinite set of generations that
are worse off. Hence, contrary to the standard Hammond Equity condition, the
weakly welfare increasing transfer from the better-off present to the worse-off future
specified in condition HEF always increases the total amount of utility along a
stream, if utilities are made (at least) cardinally measurable and fully comparable.
This entails that condition HEF is implied by both the Pigou-Dalton principle
of transfers and the Lorenz domination principle, independently of what specific
cardinal utility scale is imposed. Hence, the condition can be endorsed both from
an egalitarian and utilitarian point of view. In particular, condition HEF is much
weaker and more compelling than the standard Hammond Equity condition.
In an environment where O, C, TI, S, IF, and EP hold, the addition of HEF
leads to the following condition.
Lemma 1 Assume that O, C, TI, S, IF, EP, and HEF hold. Then, for each
t ≥ 1, u′′t > u′t > W (t+1u′) > W (t+1u′′) implies W (tu′) ≥W (tu′′).
Proof. Write W (t+1u′) = w′ and W (t+1u′′) = w′′. By Proposition 1, tu′ ∼t
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(u′t, conw′) and tu′′ ∼t (u′′t , conw′′), while, by HEF, (u′t, conw′) º (u′′t , conw′′).
Transitivity yields the result.
If we say that the present is worse (better) off than the future whenever ut <
W (t+1u) (ut > W (t+1u)), also for streams where well-being is not constant from
the second period on, then Lemma 1 means the following: If the present is better off
than the future, and a sacrifice now leads to a gain for the future that is equivalent
to an increase in their stationary equivalent, then such a transfer from the present
to the future is weakly desirable in social evaluation, as long as the present remains
better off than the future.
For each t ≥ 1, the social preferences at time t, ºt, evaluate utility streams
starting at time t. Since the cardinality of infinite streams is the same independently
of when they start, one may, however, pose the following question: Do generations
{t, t + 1, . . . } envy (cf. Varian, 1974) the situation that generations {s, s + 1, . . . }
will be in, if the social preferences at time t, ºt, are used to compare tu and su?
I.e., does tu ºt su hold? In the same way, generations {s, s + 1, . . . } may use the
social preferences at time s, ºs, to compare their utility stream with the stream
of generations {t, t + 1, . . . }; i.e., does tu ºs su hold? By condition TI, such
a comparison by means of social preferences across time based on the concept of
‘envy’ does not depend on whether one applies the social preferences at time t or
at time s. Hence, we may unequivocally determine whether, along 1u, the stream
starting at time t is socially preferred to the stream starting at time s.
By invoking HEF in addition to the conditions of Proposition 1, it turns out
that, along any 1u, the stream starting at an earlier time t will never be socially
preferred to the stream starting at a later time s.
Proposition 3 There exist social preferences, º, satisfying O, C, TI, S, IF, EP,
and HEF. For any such social preferences º, the following holds: For any 1u ∈
[0, 1]∞, tu ¹ su whenever t < s.
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Proof. Consider the social preferences represented by the following social welfare
function:
W (1u) = λ lim sup
t→∞
ut + (1− λ) lim inf
t→∞ ut , where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 .
It can be verified by inspection that these social preferences satisfy O, C, TI, S,
IF, EP, and HEF, establishing the first part of the proposition.
For the second part, it is by Proposition 1 sufficient to show that we will arrive
at a contradiction if W (1u) > W (2u). Therefore, suppose W (1u) > W (2u). Write
W (1u) = w and keep in mind that 1u ∼ conw.
If u1 ≤ w, then, by the properties of Υ,
W (1u) = Υ(u1,W (2u)) < Υ(w,W (conw)) =W (1u) ,
ruling out this case.
If u1 > w, select some w′ ∈ (W (2u), w). By Lemma 1,
W (1u) = Υ(u1,W (2u)) ≤ Υ(w,W (conw′)) < Υ(w,W (conw)) =W (1u) ,
since u1 > w > W (conw′) > W (2u), ruling out also this case.
This result can be interpreted as follows: In any stream where the present
is better off than the future, i.e., ut > W (t+1u), then reducing ut to the sta-
tionary equivalent of W (t+1u) without changing t+1u, i.e., letting ut = W (t+1u),
does not affect the social evaluation of the stream. This in turn means that, in
social evaluation of streams across time, a stream starting at t+ 1 cannot be worse
than a stream starting at t.
The result means that it might be unwise to define the concept of a ‘sustainable
development’ in terms of non-decreasing intergenerational social welfare W , rather
than in terms of the feasibility of sharing ut with future generations: the condition
of non-decreasing intergenerational social welfare W is a vacuous restriction under
the conditions of Proposition 3, while requiring generation t to be able potentially
to share ut with future generations is a non-vacuous restriction.
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One might consider “Hammond equity for the present” by requiring, for each t ≥
1, u′′ < u′ < w′ < w′′ implies (u′, conw′) ºt (u′′, conw′′). However, this contradicts a
finding included in Proposition 1, namely that Υ(u,w) is increasing in w. Moreover,
some would question the ethical appeal of requiring any sacrifice from an infinite
number of generations to help the worst-off first generation. Maximin implies that
only the present matters in comparisons where the first generation is worst-off, and
this would be inconsistent with the framework of Section 2. Consequently, maximin
cannot be characterized within this framework.
4 Present-future linearity
Consider again utility streams (u′, conw′) and (u′′, conw′′) with well-being constant
from the second period on. Assume that utilities are at least cardinally measurable
and fully comparable. Introduce the following utilitarian condition.
Condition PFL (Present-future linearity) For each t ≥ 1, (u′, conw′) ºt (u′′,
conw
′′) implies (v′, conx′) ºt (v′′, conx′′) whenever v′ − u′ = v′′ − u′′ and x′ − w′ =
x′′ − w′′.
By combining condition PFL with the conditions of Proposition 1, we show
through the following two lemmas that the social preferences can be represented by
a social welfare function that is linear in present utility and future utility. This in
turn means that we can obtain a new characterization of discounted utilitarianism
by imposing that PFL holds and HEF does not hold.
Lemma 2 Assume that O, C, TI, S, IF, EP, and PFL hold. Then
W (u′, conw′) ≥W (u′′, conw′′) implies W (u′, conw′) ≥W (u, conw) ≥W (u′′, conw′′)
W (u′, conw′) > W (u′′, conw′′) implies W (u′, conw′) > W (u, conw) > W (u′′, conw′′)
whenever α ∈ (0, 1), u = (1− α)u′ + αu′′ and w = (1− α)w′ + αw′′.
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Proof. By Proposition 1, the social preferences, º, are represented byW having
the property that W (u, conw) = Υ(u,w) for a stream where well-being is constant
from the second period on.
Assume that W (u′, conw′) ≥ W (u′′, conw′′). Since, by Proposition 1, Υ(u,w) is
increasing in w, it follows that the lemma is trivial if u′ = u′′. Therefore, assume
u′ 6= u′′.
Suppose that (u, conw) satisfies u = (1−α)u′+αu′′ and w < (1−α)w′+αw′′ for
some α ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists a rational number α˜ = m/n, where m and n are
two integers satisfying 0 < m < n, such that u˜ := (1− α˜)u′+ α˜u′′ ≥ u and w˜ := (1−
α˜)w′+ α˜w′′ > w. Let, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, ui = u′+ i
(
u′′−u′)/n and wi = w′+ i(w′′−
w′
)
/n. Hence, (u′, conw′) = (u0, conw0), (u˜, conw˜) = (um, conwm), and (u′′, conw′′) =
(un, conwn). Note that, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, ui−u1 = ui−1−u0 = (i−1)
(
u′′−u′)/n and
wi−w1 = wi−1−w0 = (i−1)
(
w′′−w′)/n. IfW (u0, conw0) < W (u1, conw1), then by
PFL,W (ui−1, conwi−1) < W (ui, conwi) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, leading by transitivity
to the contradiction that W (u′, conw′) < W (u′′, conw′′). Therefore, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
W (ui−1, conwi−1) ≥W (ui, conwi). By transitivity,
W (u′, conw′) =W (u0, conw0) ≥W (um, conwm) =W (u˜, conw˜) > W (u, conw)
since u˜ ≥ u, w˜ > w, and Υ(u,w) is non-decreasing in u and increasing in w.
Since Υ(u,w) is continuous, it now follows that W (u′, conw′) ≥ W (u, conw)
whenever α ∈ (0, 1), u = (1− α)u′ + αu′′ and w = (1− α)w′ + αw′′.
An analogous argument yields W (u, conw) ≥W (u′′, conw′′) whenever α ∈ (0, 1),
u = (1− α)u′ + αu′′ and w = (1− α)w′ + αw′′.
If W (u′, conw′) > W (u′′, conw′′), then it can likewise be shown thatW (u′, conw′)
> W (u, conw) and W (u, conw) > W (u′′, conw′′) whenever α ∈ (0, 1), u = (1−α)u′+
αu′′ and w = (1− α)w′ + αw′′.
Lemma 3 Assume that O, C, TI, S, IF, EP, and PFL hold. Then there exists
δ ∈ (0, 1] such that the social preferences, º, are represented by a social welfare
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function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] satisfying, for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞,
W (tu) = (1− δ)ut + δW (t+1u) .
Proof. Since, by Proposition 1, the social preferences, º, are represented by W
having the property that W (tu) =W (ut, conw), where W (t+1u) = w, it is sufficient
to consider streams (u′, conw′) and (u′′, conw′′) where well-being is constant from
the second period on. Moreover, since by Proposition 1, W (u, conw) = Υ(u,w) for
any such stream and Υ(u,w) is increasing in w, it is sufficient to show that there
exists δ ∈ (0, 1] such that W (u′, conw′) =W (u′′, conw′′) whenever (1− δ)u′ + δw′ =
(1− δ)u′′ + δw′′.
Since Υ(u,w) is continuous, non-decreasing in u and increasing in w, there ex-
ist (v′, conx′) and (v′′, conx′′) with v′ < v′′ and x′ ≥ x′′ such that W (v′, conx′) =
Υ(v′, x′) = Υ(v′′, x′′) =W (v′′, conx′′). Define δ ∈ (0, 1] by
δ :=
v′′ − v′
v′′ − v′ + x′ − x′′ ,
so that (1− δ)v′ + δx′ = (1− δ)v′′ + δx′′.
Consider any (u′, conw′) and (u′′, conw′′) satisfying (1− δ)u′+ δw′ = (1− δ)u′′+
δw′′. If u′ = u′′, then w′ = w′′ as δ > 0, and W (u′, conw′) = W (u′′, conw′′) follows
trivially. Therefore, assume w.l.o.g. that u′ < u′′. Choose some d ∈ (0,min{u′′ −
u′, v′′− v′}) and determine α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1) by (1−α)u′+αu′′ = u′+ d and
(1− β)v′ + βv′′ = v′ + d. Define (u, conw) and (v, conx) by
u := (1− α)u′ + αu′′ w := (1− α)w′ + αw′′
v := (1− β)v′ + βv′′ x := (1− β)x′ + βx′′
By Lemma 2, W (v′, conx′) = W (v, conx). Furthermore, since u − u′ = d = v − v′
and w′−w = 1−δδ ·d = x′−x, so that u′− v′ = u− v and w′−x′ = w−x, PFL now
implies W (u′, conw′) = W (u, conw). By applying Lemma 2 once more, we obtain
W (u′, conw′) =W (u′′, conw′′).
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Proposition 4 There exist social preferences, º, satisfying O, C, TI, S, IF, EP,
PFL, and HEF. For any such social preferences º, the following holds: 1u′ º 1u′′
implies (1v′T , T+1u
′) º (1v′′T , T+1u′′) for any T ≥ 1 and 1v′T , 1v′′T ∈ [0, 1]T .
Proof. Consider the social preferences represented by the following social welfare
function:
W (1u) = λ lim sup
t→∞
ut + (1− λ) lim inf
t→∞ ut , where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 .
It can be verified by inspection that these social preferences satisfy O, C, TI, S,
IF, EP, PFL, and HEF, establishing the first part of the proposition.
Assume that the social preferences, º, satisfy O, C, TI, S, IF, EP, and PFL.
By Lemma 3, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1] such that º is represented by a social welfare
function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] satisfying, for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞, W (tu) = (1 − δ)ut +
δW (t+1u). Suppose δ < 1. Construct (u′, conw′) and (u′′, conw′′) where
u′′ > u′ > w′ > w′′ and u′′ − u′ > δ
1− δ
(
w′ − w′′)
implying that W (u′, conw′) = (1 − δ)u′ + δw′ < (1 − δ)u′′ + δw′′ = W (u′′, conw′′).
This precludes that HEF holds. Hence, if the social preferences º satisfy O, C,
TI, S, IF, EP, PFL, and HEF, then º is represented by a social welfare function
W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] satisfying, for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞, W (tu) =W (t+1u). Then
W (1u′) =W (T+1u′) =W (1v′T , T+1u
′)
W (1u′′) =W (T+1u′′) =W (1v′′T , T+1u
′′)
follows by transitivity, implying that the social evaluation of two streams does not
depend on the utilities at times 1, 2, . . . , T , for any T ≥ 1.
Proposition 4 means that, if both PFL and HEF are added to the conditions of
Proposition 1, then the social preferences entail invariance for the well-being during
any finite part of the stream; only the limiting behavior of the utility stream, as
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time goes to infinity, matters. Hence, with PFL as an additional condition it is
not only the case that u′′t > u′t > W (t+1u′) > W (t+1u′′) implies W (tu′) ≥ W (tu′′)
as reported in Lemma 1 under HEF and the conditions of Proposition 1. Rather,
W (t+1u′) > W (t+1u′′) implies W (tu′) > W (tu′′) even if u′′t > u′t > W (t+1u′) does
not hold. If this were not the case—i.e., that a gain to the first generation outweighed
a loss to future generations when the first generation is worst off—then we would
immediately get a conflict with HEF by applying PFL and considering a similar
case where the first generation is better off.
This motivates looking at the consequences of adding PFL to the conditions
of Proposition 1 in a setting where HEF does not hold.4 As the following result
establishes, this leads to a new axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism.
Proposition 5 (Discounted utilitarianism) Assume thatO, C, TI, S, IF, EP,
and PFL hold and that HEF does not hold. Then there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
the social preferences, º, are represented by the social welfare functionW : [0, 1]∞ →
[0, 1] defined by, for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞,
W (tu) = (1− δ) ·
∑∞
s=t
δs−tus . (DU)
Proof. Assume that the social preferences, º, satisfy O, C, TI, S, IF, EP,
and PFL. By Lemma 3, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1] such that º is represented by a
social welfare function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] satisfying, for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞, W (tu) =
(1− δ)ut + δW (t+1u).
Since HEF does not hold, there exist (u′, conw′) and (u′′, conw′′) such that
u′′ > u′ > w′ > w′′ and (u′, conw′) ≺ (u′′, conw′′) ,
precluding that δ = 1. Thus, since δ ∈ (0, 1), W (tu) can be written as in (DU) .
4It follows from the definition of condition HEF that HEF does not hold if there exist t ≥ 1
and u′′ > u′ > w′ > w′′ such that (u′, conw′) ≺t (u′′, conw′′).
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It can be verified by inspection that, under the social preferences determined by
(DU) for some δ ∈ (0, 1), O, C, TI, S, IF, EP, and PFL hold, while HEF does
not hold.
Proposition 5 means that, under the conditions of Proposition 1, assuming that
PFL holds and HEF does not hold precludes the use of interpersonal level com-
parability in social evaluation, since discounted utilitarianism does not rely on such
information (even if utilities are level comparable).
Chichilnisky (1996) presents an axiomatic approach to ‘sustainable’ social pref-
erences. ‘Sustainable’ social preferences satisfy our conditions O, C, S, and EP,5
as well as Chichilnisky’s Axiom 1 (“No dictatorship of the present”) and Axiom 2
(“No dictatorship of the future”). She shows existence of ‘sustainable’ social pref-
erences that satisfy the additional property of ‘independence’, which is related to
our condition PFL. However, our Propositions 4 and 5 imply that there exists no
‘sustainable’ social preferences that satisfy both TI and IF in addition to PFL :
• On the one hand, if HEF holds, then it follows from Proposition 4 that O,
C, TI, S, IF, EP, and PFL are in direct conflict with Chichilnisky’s Axiom 2
(“No dictatorship of the future”), which rules out all social welfare functions
depending solely on the limiting behavior of the utility streams.
• On the other hand, if HEF does not hold, then it follows from Proposition 5
that O, C, TI, S, IF, EP, and PFL are in direct conflict with Chichilnisky’s
Axiom 1 (“No dictatorship of the present”), which rules out all forms of dis-
counted sums of utilities.
It appears to be an open question whether there exist ‘sustainable’ social preferences
satisfying both TI and IF.
5I.e., ‘sustainable’ social preferences satisfy all conditions of Proposition 1 except conditions
TI and IF. Chichilnisky (1996) actually imposes sensitivity in the sense of Strong Pareto. This
condition implies S and EP, as discussed in Section 6 below.
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5 Combining HEF with a restricted form of PFL
Consider a setting where the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. Proposition 4 shows
that the combination of PFL and HEF leads to a complete disregard for any finite
portion of the utility stream. Hence, if we want to combine PFL with sensitivity
for the interests of a finite number of generations, we must rule out HEF.
Since HEF may be thought of as a weak and compelling equity condition
(cf. Proposition 2), it is of interest to investigate whether the condition can be
combined with a weakened form of the utilitarian condition PFL, while keeping
sensitivity for the interests of the present in certain situations. Hence, consider
PFL restricted to situations where the present is worse off than the future.
Condition RPFL (Restricted present-future linearity) For each t ≥ 1, (u′, conw′)
ºt (u′′, conw′′) implies (v′, conx′) ºt (v′′, conx′′) whenever v′−u′ = v′′−u′′, x′−w′ =
x′′ − w′′, u′ ≤ w′, u′′ ≤ w′′, v′ ≤ x′, and v′′ ≤ x′′.
The following result is obtained from the analysis of Section 4 by substituting
RPFL for PFL.
Proposition 6 Assume that O, C, TI, S, IF, EP, RPFL, and HEF hold. Then
there exists δ ∈ (0, 1] such that the social preferences, º, are represented by a social
welfare function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] satisfying, for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞,
W (tu) =

(1− δ)ut + δW (t+1u) if ut < W (t+1u)
ut =W (t+1u) if ut =W (t+1u)
W (t+1u) if ut > W (t+1u) .
Hence, with δ < 1, social preferences satisfying RPFL and HEF in addition to
the conditions of Proposition 1 allow the present to matter if it is worse off than
the future, while only the future matters if the present is better off. Thereby, a sus-
tainability constraint is imposed on discounted utilitarianism. It also follows that
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Chichilnisky’s (1996) Axioms 1 and 2 are both satisfied.6 Note that if δ < 1, then
social preferences satisfyingRPFL andHEF in addition to the conditions of Propo-
sition 1 make non-trivial use of both unit comparability and level comparability.
It has been shown by Asheim (1988) and others that discounted utilitarianism
combined with a sustainability constraint in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of cap-
ital accumulation and resource depletion leads to streams that may appeal to our
ethical intuition. The reason is that this allows for development in an initial phase
when a small capital stock and a large resource stock lead to high capital productiv-
ity, while protecting generations in the distant future against the grave consequences
of discounting when resource exhaustion leads to a vanishing flow of resource ex-
traction and low and diminishing capital productivity. Asheim et al. (2004) apply
the social preferences that are partially characterized by Proposition 6 to this model
and show that they lead to the streams investigated in Asheim (1988, Section 3).
6 Relaxing continuity
The axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism given above in Proposition 5 differs
from the one established by Koopmans (1960) in several respects:
• Koopmans’ period independence conditions Postulate 3 and Postulate 3′ have
been replaced by our condition PFL.
• Koopmans’ sensitivity condition Postulate 2 has been replaced by our condi-
tion S and an assumption that condition HEF does not hold.
Let us investigate the latter of these differences closer.
Koopmans’ Postulate 2 requires, within the current setting where ut is one-
dimensional, that there exist u′t, u′′t , and t+1u such that (u′t, t+1u) Â (u′′t , t+1u).
6Such social preferences are still not ‘sustainable’ in the sense of Chichilnisky (1996) since Strong
Pareto does not hold; cf. footnote 5.
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Thus, this condition imposes sensitivity for the interests of the first generation. It
therefore rules out the kind of social preferences that satisfy O, C, TI, S, IF, EP,
PFL, and HEF (cf. Proposition 4), as these entail invariance for the well-being
during any finite part of the stream.
Since sensitivity for the interests of each generation is an appealing ethical intu-
ition, it is of interest to consider the following strengthening of our condition S.
Condition SP (Strong Pareto) For each t ≥ 1, if for all s ≥ t, u′s ≥ u′′s , and for
some r ≥ t, u′r > u′′r , then tu′ Ât tu′′.
It is clear that condition SP implies both Koopmans’ Postulate 2 and our condition
S. It also entails our condition EP, which coincides with Koopmans’ Postulate 5.
Since SP implies conditions S and EP and leads to sensitivity for the interests
of the first generation, we obtain the following version of Proposition 1.
Proposition 1∗ Assume that O, C, TI, SP, and IF hold. Then the social prefer-
ences are represented by a social welfare function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] satisfying
(a) if limn→∞ sups≥t |uns − u′s| = 0 and, for all n, W (tun) ≥ W (tu′′) (resp.
W (tu′′) ≥W (tun)), then W (tu′) ≥W (tu′′) (resp. W (tu′′) ≥W (tu′)), and
(b) for all tu ∈ [0, 1]∞, conW (tu) ∼t tu and W (tu) = Υ(ut,W (t+1u)), where
Υ(u,w) is continuous, and increasing in u and w.
However, it turns out that SP is in direct conflict with C and HEF.
Proposition 7 There exist no social preferences, ºt, satisfying C, SP, and HEF.
Proof. Let
u′′ > u1 = u2 = · · · = un = · · · = u′ > w1 > w2 > · · · > wn > · · · > w′ = w′′
and assume that limn→∞wn = w′. Then, for all n, (un, conwn) ºt (u′′, conw′′) by
HEF and (u′, conw′) ≺t (u′′, conw′′) by SP. This contradicts C since (un, conwn)
converges to (u′, conw′) in the sup topology.
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Proposition 7 is related to a well-known result established by Diamond (1965),
in the sense that it shows another questionable implication of combining SP and C.
Diamond establishes that Weak Anonymity—meaning that two utility streams
are indifferent in social evaluation when the one is derived from the other through
a finite permutation—is inconsistent with C and SP. In a recent paper, Basu and
Mitra (2003a) extend Diamond’s (1965) result by showing that SP even in combi-
nation with an assumption of numerical representability is in conflict with Weak
Anonymity.
Equally worrying, we will claim, is the fact that C and SP are inconsistent
with assigning priority to an infinite number of worst off generations in comparisons
where the assignment of such priority only reduces the well-being of the better-off
present generation, as expressed by HEF. In this respect, note that HEF neither
implies nor is implied byWeak Anonymity, and thus the results are also different
from a formal point of view.
Since HEF is implied by each of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers WPD
and the Lorenz domination principleWLD under O and SP (cf. Proposition 2 and
recall that SP implies S), it follows as a corollary to Proposition 7 that O, C, and
SP are inconsistent with each of WPD and WLD, i.e, with assigning priority to
the worse off in comparisons where the assignment of such priority does not reduce
total utility. In this respect, Proposition 7 is closely related to the investigation by
Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003), who however show that SP are inconsistent with
Pigou-Dalton and Lorenz domination principles under weaker versions of O and C.
Proposition 7 implies that C must be excluded from the list of conditions if
we want to impose both SP and HEF. This leads to the following versions of
Propositions 3 and 4.
Proposition 3∗ There exist social preferences, º, satisfying O, TI, SP, IF, and
HEF.
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Proof. Consider the orderings Infinite-horizon leximin and Infinite-hori-
zon utilitarianism, as defined by Bossert et al. (2004). Alternatively, consider the
Utilitarian quasi-ordering, as defined by Basu and Mitra (2003b), or the quasi-
orderings S-Leximin, W-Leximin, Catching Up, and Overtaking, as defined
by Asheim and Tungodden (2004), and complete these by invoking Szpilrajn’s (1930)
Lemma (cf. Svensson, 1980). It can be verified that each of these social preferences
satisfies O, TI, SP, IF, and HEF.
Proposition 4∗ There exist social preferences, º, satisfying O, TI, SP, IF, PFL,
and HEF.
Proof. Consider the ordering Infinite-horizon utilitarianism, as defined
by Bossert et al. (2004). Alternatively, consider the Utilitarian quasi-ordering,
as defined by Basu and Mitra (2003b), or the quasi-orderings Catching Up and
Overtaking, as defined by Asheim and Tungodden (2004), and complete these by
invoking Szpilrajn’s (1930) Lemma (cf. Svensson, 1980). It can be verified that each
of these social preferences satisfies O, TI, SP, IF, PFL, and HEF.
Moreover, Proposition 7 entails that we can characterize discounted utilitarian-
ism without assuming that HEF does not hold, if we strengthen S to SP.
Proposition 5∗ (Discounted utilitarianism) Assume that O, C, TI, SP, IF,
and PFL hold. Then there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that the social preferences, º, are
represented by the social welfare function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] defined by, for all
tu ∈ [0, 1]∞,
W (tu) = (1− δ) ·
∑∞
s=t
δs−tus . (DU)
Proof. Assume that the social preferences, º, satisfy O, C, TI, SP, IF, and
PFL. Since SP implies that S and EP hold, and by Proposition 7, that HEF
does not hold, it follows by Proposition 5 that º is represented by a social welfare
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function W : [0, 1]∞ → [0, 1] determined by (DU) for some δ ∈ (0, 1).
It can be verified by inspection that the social preferences determined by (DU)
for some δ ∈ (0, 1) satisfy O, C, TI, SP, IF, and PFL.
In line with earlier literature, the analysis of this section indicates that C is not
an innocent technical assumption; rather, the condition has significant normative
implications in the social evaluation of infinite horizon utility streams. Perhaps it is
informative that such normative implications be conveyed explicitly, as in Proposi-
tion 5, rather than function in a implicit way, as in the alternative characterization
of discounted utilitarianism given in Proposition 5∗.
Moreover, even though continuity conditions can be useful from a pragmatic
point of view, as such conditions allow for the application of Weierstrass’ Theorem,
they do not by themselves provide a normative justification for ruling out the kind
of social preferences considered in the proofs of Propositions 3∗ and 4∗. Such social
preferences satisfy O, TI, SP, IF, EP, HEF. In the case of Infinite-horizon util-
itarianism (Bossert et al., 2004) and the completed Utilitarian (Basu and Mitra,
2003b), Catching Up and Overtaking criteria (Asheim and Tungodden, 2004,
inspired by Atsumi, 1965, and von Weizsa¨cker, 1965) they even satisfy PFL. How-
ever, in comparisons where the interests of the future are infinitely more important,
such preferences contradict C in order to allow for sensitivity for the interests of the
present generation.
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